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Abstract—Interactive consistency is the problem in which n
nodes, where up to t may be byzantine, each with its own private
value, run an algorithm that allows all non-faulty nodes to infer
the values of each other node. This problem is relevant to critical
applications that rely on the combination of the opinions of
multiple peers to provide a service. Examples include monitoring
a content source to prevent equivocation or to track variability
in the content provided, and resolving divergent state amongst
the nodes of a distributed system.
Previous works assume a fully synchronous system, where one
can make strong assumptions such as negligible message delivery
delays and/or detection of absent messages. However, practical,
real-world systems are mostly asynchronous, i.e., they exhibit
only some periods of synchrony during which message delivery
is timely, thus requiring a different approach. In this paper,
we present a thorough study on practical interactive consistency.
We leverage the vast prior work on broadcast and byzantine
consensus algorithms to design, implement and evaluate a set
of algorithms, with varying timing assumptions and message
complexity, that can be used to achieve interactive consistency
in real-world distributed systems.
We provide a complete, open-source implementation of each
proposed interactive consistency algorithm by building a multi-
layered stack of protocols that include several broadcast proto-
cols, as well as a binary and a multi-valued consensus protocol.
Most of these protocols have never been implemented and
evaluated in a real system before. We analyze the performance of
our suite of algorithms experimentally by engaging in both single
instance and multiple parallel instances of each alternative.
Keywords—Interactive consistency, Asynchronous, Consensus,
Agreement, Byzantine
I. INTRODUCTION
Interactive consistency (IC) is defined in a system of n
distinct nodes, each having its own private value, where up
to t may be byzantine (faulty). The goal is for all non-faulty
nodes to compute the same vector of values. For each non-
faulty node, the corresponding slot in the vector should contain
that node’s private value.
To date, related work regarding interactive consistency has
provided solutions tailored for synchronous systems ([1], [2],
[3], [4], [5]). These algorithms deliver useful theoretical insight
and may be suitable in cases (e.g., shared memory multi-
processor systems) where one can make strong assumptions
such as negligible message delivery delays ([6]) and/or de-
tection of absent messages ([1], [2]). However, these assump-
tions are ill-suited for practical, real-world distributed systems
which, in their vast majority are mostly asynchronous, i.e., they
exhibit only some periods of synchrony during which message
delivery is timely.
In a fully asynchronous environment, researchers have
proposed a myriad of algorithms for closely related topics,
such as byzantine agreement and byzantine consensus. Conse-
quently, one might assume interactive consistency can be easily
achieved in an asynchronous setting, by a simple synthesis
of one or more steps of these algorithms. However, this is
not the case, as it is impossible to detect process crashes
in a completely asynchronous system, where messages can
take arbitrarily long to be delivered. Additionally, in an asyn-
chronous system, it is impossible to guarantee simultaneously,
that all honest parties inputs’ are included in the computation
(in our case, in the resulting vector of values), and that all
honest parties are guaranteed to terminate, as proved in [7].
These are the reasons vector consensus is considered the only
achievable equivalent of interactive consistency for completely
asynchronous systems ([8]). In vector consensus, the only
guarantee is that the resulting vector contains at least 2t + 1
values, of which at least t+1 were proposed by honest nodes.
Interactive consistency is required in a variety of real-
world, critical applications. For example, a distributed fault-
tolerant voting application runs a light-weight voting protocol
during election hours [9]. At election end-time, each node’s
local view of the cast votes may be inconsistent with the views
of the others. Interactive consistency can be used here once,
upon election end-time, to derive a single set of votes and
produce the result. As another example, an application may
employ multiple peers to monitor the content delivered by a
single source, as a means to verify its integrity. This prevents
the source from equivocating, i.e., distributing different content
to different peers, with the additional benefit of being able to
prove reliably if such equivocation took place. Another closely
related application is the recording of the variability in web
content, as a means to track censorship ([10]), or other forms of
personalization ([11]). Other applications include the ability of
sensors to reliably compute complicated functions that depend
on the combination of inputs from other sensors ([12]), system
diagnosis, such as failure detection and group membership,
cloud computing ([1]), and other problems requiring global
knowledge.
In this paper, we present algorithms for solving interac-
tive consistency in real-world distributed systems, with the
minimal possible timing assumptions. We leverage prior work
on broadcast and byzantine consensus protocols to design
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our algorithms. We describe how we directly address, or
circumvent, both theoretical and practical challenges that arise
in solving IC. Examples of theoretical challenges are the well-
known FLP impossibility result ([13]) and the impossibility of
simultaneously achieving input completeness and guaranteed
termination ([7]). Practical challenges, on the other hand, are
a result of assumptions that several theoretical papers use to
prove their algorithms, but that, unfortunately, do not hold in
practice. Examples are unbounded memory at each node and a
loss-less and/or corruption-free network ([5], [14]). Moreover,
we have formally proved the correctness of our proposed
algorithms.
To evaluate our algorithms, we first analytically compare
their message complexity. We implement all of the proposed
algorithms and present experimental measurements that consist
of both single and multiple parallel instances. We compare the
algorithms’ performance in terms of throughput and latency
and draw conclusions as to the appropriateness of using each
algorithm in varied network environments.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We present a study of interactive consistency in practical,
real-world systems, illustrate the theoretical and practical
challenges that need to be addressed, and propose algorithms
for achieving interactive consistency in such environments.
• We provide an open-source implementation of each of the
proposed alternatives. This required the development of a
protocol stack that includes various asynchronous broadcast
primitives, as well as a binary and a multi-valued byzantine
consensus protocol. Some of these protocols (e.g., [8],
[14]), have never been implemented and evaluated (to our
knowledge) in a real system.
• We evaluate our algorithms experimentally by running both
serial and parallel executions of each algorithm and compare
their performance in terms of throughput and latency, in
both LAN and WAN settings. We find that simple protocol
variations that restrict the behavior of malicious nodes
improve performance.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Our study has unveiled a large incoherence in the bib-
liography, regarding the terms “Byzantine Agreement” and
“Byzantine Consensus”. These are often used to refer to the
same problem (e.g., [13] and [15]), while others, e.g., [16],
use the terms interchangeably, even though these are two
distinct problems. There is also inconsistent use of the term
“Interactive Consistency”, e.g., [17], [18]. To alleviate any
confusion and for clarity, we start with some basic definitions.
Byzantine Agreement. Assume a system of n nodes,
where a single source ni has a private value vi, and the
following must be achieved:
• Agreement: All non-faulty nodes must agree on the same
value.
• Validity: If ni is non-faulty, then the agreed upon value by
all non-faulty nodes is vi.
• Termination: All non-faulty nodes must eventually decide
on a value.
This problem, also known as the “Byzantine Generals
Problem”, was introduced by Lamport et al. [19]. Earlier work
has proved there is no solution for the asynchronous case [14],
when the source is faulty. Agreement algorithms that tolerate
byzantine failures of (non-source) nodes in asynchronous sys-
tems are presented in [20] and [21].
Byzantine Consensus. Assume a system of n nodes, where
each node ni has a private value vi, and the following must
be achieved:
• Agreement: All non-faulty nodes must agree on the same
value v ∈ {v1, ..., vn}.
• Validity: If all non-faulty nodes have the same initial value
v, then the agreed upon value by all non-faulty nodes is v.
• Termination: All non-faulty nodes must eventually decide
on a value.
The byzantine consensus problem is one of the most
studied topics in distributed systems and the main topic of the
well-known FLP impossibility result ([13]). There are several
types of consensus protocols. The first distinction revolves
around determinism (or non-determinism). In a deterministic
consensus protocol, given the set of input values on all nodes,
the message schedule and the failures that occur (if any),
the result will always be the same. Deterministic consensus
protocols require a synchronous system ([22]). In a purely
asynchronous system, consensus can be achieved by random-
ization. FLP is circumvented by having nodes locally toss
a coin to decide on their input values, in round r + 1, in
cases where consensus cannot be achieved in round r. Thus,
the result may be different across executions with the same
inputs. Examples of randomized protocols that employ the
local coin construct are introduced by Bracha [14], Bracha
and Toueg [23] and Ben-Or [24]. These algorithms guarantee
eventual termination after a probabilistic number of rounds.
In [15], a trusted, non-faulty dealer is additionally employed
to bound the number of rounds required to achieve consensus.
In our work, we leverage the randomized approach by Bracha
to ensure termination because we believe it is controversial to
assume a trusted entity in an otherwise byzantine environment.
Other works ([25], [26]) leverage verifiable secret sharing
techniques to implement a shared, or, common coin. These
consensus algorithms are polynomially efficient and terminate
in a constant number of rounds. Canetti et al. [25] present
one of most well-established and signature-free common coin
protocols. However, this protocol, although polynomial, is
complex to implement and has very high bit complexity [27].
Moste´faoui et al. [27] employ the common coin protocol that
is presented in [28] which has guaranteed termination but
requires a trusted dealer. We did not consider these algorithms
as they are either inefficient or require a trusted dealer.
One last distinction, regarding consensus protocols, re-
volves around the agreed upon value. All of the aforemen-
tioned protocols are binary consensus protocols, i.e., the agreed
upon value is v ∈ {0, 1}. In the multi-valued consensus
protocol of Correia et al. [8], the set of values V is of
arbitrary size. In our work, when needed, we achieve multi-
valued consensus by using primitives such as reliable broadcast
(described later) and binary consensus.
Failure Detectors. In [29], Chandra and Toueg proposed
a solution for the consensus problem, in an asynchronous
crash-fault environment, introducing a module called failure
detector (FD). There is extensive bibliography that expands
the family of FDs to a number of applications ([30], [31],
[32], [33]). In [34], Chandra and Toueg define the weakest
FD capable of solving consensus in asynchronous crash fault
systems. However, this failure detector requires known bounds
on node processing speed and message delivery, that hold after
a Global Stabilization Time ([35]). The same assumptions hold
for the Byzantine Failure detector introduced in [33]. However,
these assumptions are unlikely to hold in real-world distributed
systems, rendering both FDs unimplementable ([36], [37]).
Broadcast Primitives. All asynchronous consensus algo-
rithms employ some form of reliable broadcast protocol, where
a source broadcasts a message m, and every correct node
eventually delivers m (e.g., via an up-call to the application).
Such a broadcast satisfies the following properties ([38]):
• Validity: If a non-faulty node broadcasts a message m, then
it eventually delivers m.
• Agreement: If a non-faulty node delivers a message m, then
all non-faulty nodes eventually deliver m.
• Integrity: For any message m, every non-faulty node de-
livers m at most once iff m was previously broadcast by
sender(m).
In [14], Bracha introduced a n3 -resilient reliable broadcast
primitive (RBB, for Reliable Broadcast of Bracha) to solve
the consensus problem. Another type of broadcast primitive,
with lower message complexity, is consistent broadcast (CB).
CB is designed to relax the agreement property of reliable
broadcast, by allowing some non-faulty nodes to deliver m,
while others may deliver nothing. The standard implementation
of consistent broadcast is Reiter’s echo multicast [39].
Interactive Consistency. Assume a system of n nodes,
where each node ni has a private value vi, and the following
must be achieved:
• Agreement: All non-faulty nodes must agree on the same
vector of values V = [v1, ..., vn].
• Validity: If the private value of the non-faulty node ni is vi,
then all non-faulty nodes agree on V [i] = vi.
• Termination: All non-faulty nodes must eventually decide
on a vector V .
Interactive consistency was first introduced and studied by
Pease et al. [6], and has been the topic of several research
papers ([1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [40]), focusing on synchronous
systems. While these approaches might be feasible in environ-
ments such as shared memory multi-processors or digital flight
control systems, we believe they are ill-suited for practical,
real-world distributed systems. In [17] and [18], the authors
provide solutions to various forms of consensus, despite their
title references to IC.
A closely related problem to IC is vector consensus. These
two problems differ only in terms of the Validity condition.
Vector consensus delivers a vector with at least 2t+ 1 values,
where at least t+1 values were proposed by non-faulty nodes.
The reason for this difference is that in asynchronous systems,
it is impossible to ensure that the resulting vector has the
proposals of all non-faulty nodes ([7], [8]).
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a distributed system consisting of n nodes that
are fully connected over a network. The network is mostly
asynchronous, i.e., it exhibits one (or more, depending on the
algorithm) period of synchrony, during which message delivery
is timely. The network can drop, delay, duplicate, or deliver
messages out of order. However, we assume that messages are
eventually delivered, provided that the corresponding senders
keep on retransmitting them. We assume authenticated chan-
nels, where the receiver of a message can always identify its
sender. Each node has a public/private key pair and all nodes
know the others’ public keys. We use these keys to implement
authenticated channels, and sign messages where needed.
We assume a Byzantine failure model where nodes may
deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. We allow for a strong
adversary that can coordinate faulty nodes. However, we
assume he cannot delay the delivery of messages, or processing
on correct nodes beyond the system’s synchrony assumptions.
The adversary is also assumed to be computationally bounded,
meaning he cannot subvert common cryptographic techniques
such as signatures and message authentication codes (MACs).
IV. PRACTICAL INTERACTIVE CONSISTENCY
A. Adapting approaches from synchronous systems
The original algorithm of Pease et al. [6] requires a total of
t+1 rounds to achieve IC in a synchronous system, tolerating
up to t faults, with a total message complexity of (t + 1)n2.
Our first approach is to adapt the same algorithm by simulating
synchronous rounds with timeouts. Messages delivered after
the time frame of each round, will be disregarded and counted
towards the t system faults, according to the model presented
in [41].
Two issues arise from the use of timeouts, as highlighted
in [42]. The first one is efficiency. Assuming a timeout value
of Tr for each round, the system will always require a constant
amount of time, i.e., (t+1)Tr, to execute a request even in the
presence of a single failure. The second is choosing a correct
value for Tr. If we choose a conservative approach and set a
large value for Tr, we could increase the execution time of
the algorithm dramatically, thus, making it less practical. On
the contrary, a small value might cause some slow nodes, who
are otherwise correct, to be considered faulty. If this occurs
multiple times, as is the case when one relies on multiple
timeouts, it is possible that we will exceed the upper bound t
of total failures in the system.
To avoid the issues associated with multiple timeouts, one
might attempt to reduce IC to Byzantine Agreement (BA),
by running n parallel instances of BA, as it was suggested
for synchronous systems ([43]). In each instance, a node ni
would spread its private value vi to the rest of the system. In a
synchronous setting, this would result in all non-faulty nodes
having the same vector of values. However, in a completely
asynchronous environment, BA is impossible ([14]), as a
crashed node may never even start its instance of BA, and
nodes cannot distinguish between crashed nodes and slow
nodes. Therefore, the non-faulty nodes need to decide, at a
certain point, to exclude the suspected crashed nodes from IC
and store a default (e.g., null) value at the slot corresponding
to each crashed node. Thus, they need a synchronization
point, where they decide on the result vector; we call this
point a barrier. This synchrony assumption allows for the
circumvention of the impossibility of simultaneously achieving
input completeness and guaranteed termination in a purely
asynchronous system ([7]).
The introduction of the barrier introduces a new challenge
as, at that point, a BA instance may have delivered the result
in some nodes but not yet in others. This, for example, may be
triggered by an adversary starting his own BA instance near
the barrier. Thus, honest nodes will need to achieve consensus,
for each individual slot of the result vector, on the value to
be placed in that slot. We observe that the barrier splits the
procedure in two phases. We call the first phase the value
dissemination phase, where we assume the network delivers all
messages of non-faulty nodes by the end of the phase. Recall
that, as we stated in the first paragraph of this section, messages
delivered after the time frame of the first phase will be counted
towards the t system faults. We call the second phase, the result
consensus phase, which can be completely asynchronous. Note
that we have employed the costly BA approach for the first
phase, but have shown that a consensus phase is still required.
B. Solution using Multi-Valued Consensus
With these observations, we seek less costly alternatives
for the first phase, i.e., avoiding BA. Our first approach
is to use a simple point-to-point message exchange, where
each node announces its own private value to the rest of
the system. As this exchange is unrestricted, it may result in
each honest node receiving a different value from a malicious
node. Thus, during the result consensus phase, nodes need
to agree on the value to be placed in each slot of the result
vector. We employ the multi-valued consensus (MC) algorithm
from [8]; recall that this algorithm utilizes a binary consensus
and a reliable broadcast primitive. We want to refrain from
making any further synchrony assumptions, thus, making the
result consensus phase completely asynchronous. In order
to circumvent FLP, which states that achieving deterministic
consensus is impossible in purely asynchronous systems, we
employ a randomized consensus protocol. We use Bracha’s
binary consensus (BC) and reliable broadcast (RBB) primitives
from [44], and we run n parallel instances of MC, one for each
value of the vector.
This algorithm (IC,MC-RBB) achieves IC because, re-
gardless of the unrestricted value dissemination phase, each
instance of MC ensures that nodes agree on a single value
for each slot of the result vector respectively. (IC,MC-RBB)
uses only one synchrony barrier, as opposed to the adaptation
of Pease’s algorithm which needs t + 1. Its overall message
complexity is 10n4 + 5n3 + n2. For full derivation details of
all message complexities, and formal proofs of correctness of
all IC algorithms, we refer the reader to the Appendix.
C. Solution using Binary Consensus
Our next approach reduces the aforementioned message
complexity. We observe multi-valued consensus uses one bi-
nary consensus and two reliable broadcast instances. We avoid
the use of MC by changing the subject on which consensus is
required. In the previous algorithm, the consensus question is
“what is the actual value to be placed in the corresponding slot
of the result vector?”, because the first (value dissemination)
phase is insecure. We make the first phase secure by using
Consistent Broadcast (CB, [45]). Here, the source ni first sends
its value vi to each node; then it collects signed endorsement
responses. A recipient node endorses only the first value for
each broadcast. Once n − t such responses are accumulated,
the sender forms a uniqueness certificate ci that includes these
endorsements, and sends <ni, ci> to the rest of the nodes. CB
delivers vi iff ci has at least n− t valid signatures. Assuming
signatures are unforgeable, it is impossible for a malicious
node to construct two valid certificates for two different values.
Thus, this protocol bounds the sender to either send a single
value, or not send a value at all. As this value is guaranteed
to be unique, we change the question of the result consensus
phase to “is there a value to be placed in the corresponding slot
of the result vector?”. This question can now be answered by
a binary consensus protocol, and we utilize Bracha’s protocol
([44]) in our approach. Figure 1 depicts message exchanges
for this protocol.
Fig. 1. Diagram of message exchanges for (IC,BC-RBB), for a single value
of the result vector (repeated n times to achieve IC).
An outcome of 0 from BC causes each node to place
the null value in the corresponding slot of the result vector.
Accordingly, a result of 1 from BC instructs each node to
place the (unique) value vi in the result vector. There are
cases, however, where a consensus instance may produce a
result different than the opinion with which an honest node
entered BC. This can happen when the corresponding instance
of CB delivered the value vi at some nodes, but not at others
(e.g., when a malicious CB source sends the value, along with
the uniqueness certificate, only to some nodes). Thus, a node
may possess a value for this slot, and the result of consensus
may be 0, in which case it simply replaces the value with null.
However, the contrary may also happen, where a node did not
possess a value when it entered BC, but consensus resulted in
1. For this case, we add a final recovery phase, where a node
asks all other nodes for the correct value of the ith position of
the result vector. Any node that receives such a message replies
with the <vi, ci> tuple it possesses. At least one honest node
is guaranteed to exist and submit such a reply; this is because,
by definition of BC, if all honest nodes entered consensus with
0, the result would have been 0. As the result is 1, at least one
honest node exists which has entered consensus with 1, thus
possessing the correct value and uniqueness certificate for it.
To summarize, this IC algorithm (IC,BC-RBB) achieves IC
because: a) during the value dissemination phase, an honest
node either obtains a value guaranteed to be unique, or no value
at all, b) during the result consensus phase, all nodes agree, for
each slot of the result vector, whether to place a (guaranteed
unique) value, or the null value, and c) during the recovery
phase, any honest node is guaranteed to obtain missing values.
The overall complexity of (IC,BC-RBB) is 6n4 + 3n3 + 3n2
messages and n3+2n2 signature operations. We formally prove
the correctness of (IC,BC-RBB) in Appendix A-D.
D. Eventual Interactive Consistency
So far, we present solutions to IC using one or more syn-
chrony barriers, as the problem is unsolvable in a completely
asynchronous setting. There is, however, a weaker version of
the problem, which can be solved without timing assumptions
(synchrony barrier), which we introduce and briefly outline
two solutions. We call this weaker version Eventual Interactive
Consistency (EIC). In EIC, the Agreement part of the problem’s
definition is as follows:
• Agreement: All non-faulty nodes must eventually agree on
the same vector of values V = [v1, ..., vn].
In this scheme, a non-faulty node will eventually build
the result vector, containing all private values from all non-
faulty nodes. Until it does, however, it may have empty slots
for values it does not yet know about. In practice, the result
vector will be built slot by slot, and instead of a single up-
call to deliver the complete vector, multiple up-calls will take
place. Each up-call will inform the application the vector was
augmented by one more value. This version of the problem is
suitable, for example, for applications which gather opinions.
The idea is, the application can serve the already gathered
opinions to clients, with empty slots for the currently unknown
ones, either immediately upon request, or when a system-
defined threshold of entries has been filled in the vector.
Eventually, when all non-faulty nodes provide their opinions,
empty slots in the result vector will represent failed nodes. If
the vector is used before it is completed, the only guarantee
provided is that on a subsequent access, the previous entries in
the vector will still be included, potentially along with newer
ones.
One simple approach to achieve this is by using a version
of Reliable Broadcast (RB). All nodes start one instance and,
by definition of RB, eventually all correct nodes’ broadcasts
deliver the intended value. When one of these RB instances
completes, the corresponding slot of the vector will be filled
and a new notification will be sent to the upper level appli-
cation. This approach leaves management of the result vector
completely up to the application.
A more involved approach which, however, preserves and
manages the result vector as well, is the use of a byzantine
fault tolerant Replicated State Machine (RSM), such as [46],
[47] enhanced to handle byzantine clients ([48], [49]). Each
node of EIC becomes both a replica and a client of the same
RSM. Each IC node, as a client of the RSM, posts its private
value to the RSM as a write operation. The application running
on top of the RSM receives this write operation and accepts
it only when no prior value is known for the sending node
and this instance of EIC. Whenever an external client requests
the EIC result vector, it is dynamically compiled from entries
already posted from nodes. A malicious node cannot harm the
system as long as the RSM’s fault tolerance level (typically
t < dn3 e) is not breached, while as a client, it is prohibited
from posting more than one value by the aforementioned
functionality running at the application layer behind the RSM.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We developed an open-source protocol in Java to imple-
ment and evaluate our suite of algorithms. At the foundation
lies an authenticated channels layer that uses SSL and manages
message passing and timeout events; SSL provides for authen-
tication and message integrity. We also provide alternatives for
direct TCP/IP communication (without strong authentication),
as well as, an intra-process communication infrastructure that
allows us to run our unit tests and verify the correctness
of our implementation. The remaining layers are agnostic of
the network layout or communication means, as they simply
register event handlers to process incoming messages. Finally,
we simulate loss-less channels by creating one output queue
for each node, where each queue is handled by a different
thread. A message is deleted from a queue only when the
sender receives an acknowledgment for that specific message
by the destination.
On top of this foundation, we implement Consistent Broad-
cast, and the signature-free Reliable Broadcast primitive of
Bracha (RBB). We then implement Bracha’s binary consensus
(BC) protocol ([14]), which uses RBB. Finally, we implement
the multi-valued consensus protocol (MC) of Correia et al. [8],
using BC and RBB.
Fig. 2. The infrastructure and protocol stack of our implementation.
To reduce the overhead caused by signature operations
used in Consistent Broadcast (CB), we use authenticators as
suggested by [46]. In this scheme, nodes exchange pair-wise
messages to announce to the receiving party a symmetric secret
key to use when sending messages to the sending party. This
exchange is repeated often enough to make the symmetric key
secure. When a node wishes to multicast a message to n nodes,
it composes an authenticator, which is a vector of n HMACs,
one for each receiving node, by using the corresponding key
as input to the HMAC function. The receiving party uses
its corresponding entry of the authenticator to verify both
the integrity and the authenticity of the message, making
this scheme analogous to digital signatures (for the closed
world for which the authenticator provides HMACs). The
performance improvement is vast as, in a simple evaluation on
a contemporary desktop CPU, we can calculate approximately
300 SHA-1 based HMACs in the same amount of time required
to produce a single digital signature using RSA with a 1024-bit
key.
Bracha’s binary consensus algorithm operates in a prob-
abilistic number of phases. It requires nodes to buffer all
messages, even the ones referring to future phases to guarantee
termination. This, in conjuction with the fact that the number
of rounds is not bounded, may require nodes to buffer an
arbitrary number of messages. In a practical system, it is
unrealistic to assume nodes with unbounded memory. Thus,
malicious nodes could bombard non-faulty nodes with spurious
messages which, since they are required to buffer them, would
result in a state-explosion attack. Our approach on this matter
is twofold. First, we identify that each phase of Bracha’s
consensus protocol is independent from any previous phases.
This means that once a node enters phase i+ 1, it can safely
discard any buffered messages from phase i since they are no
longer needed. Second, to defend against the state-explosion
attack, nodes buffer messages whose current phase number i
is a total of H phases ahead. However, this requires a recovery
protocol for slow nodes that have fallen behind and are unable
to progress due to the fact that the others have reached a phase
j > i+H , which we leave as future work.
Finally, we leverage this protocol stack to provide the
following interactive consistency algorithm suite:
1) Our adaption of Pease’s algorithm (IC,PEASE).
2) Consistent Broadcast for the value dissemination phase
and Bracha’s binary consensus, in conjunction with the
reliable broadcast of Bracha for the result consensus phase
(IC,BC-RBB).
3) Multicast for the value dissemination phase and multi-
valued consensus, in conjunction with the reliable broad-
cast of Bracha for the result consensus phase (IC,MC-
RBB).
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the performance
of the algorithms presented above, under various system set-
tings. We conduct our experiments using a dedicated cluster
with eight identical nodes, directly connected via an isolated
1Gbps Ethernet switch. Each node is configured with 4GB of
RAM and dual Intel(R) Xeon(TM) CPUs running at 2.80GHz.
We utilize up to 16 logical nodes by placing at most 2 nodes
per physical machine. Measurements remain accurate, as cross-
machine communication is always required for the algorithms
to progress and overshadows any communication benefits from
co-located nodes. To emulate a WAN environment we utilize
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Fig. 3. Latency of IC,BC-RBB and IC-MC-RBB, with faults in WAN setting.
netem [50], a network emulator for Linux, to inject a uniform
latency of 50ms.
In Figure 4a, we illustrate the total time required to
complete one instance of each algorithm, without faults, in a
local area network (LAN) setting. All algorithms are optimized
to progress without waiting for timeouts, if all expected
replies have been received. Our adaptation of Pease’s algorithm
exhibits the best performance due to its significantly lower
message complexity and the fact that no timeouts are triggered.
From the remaining alternatives, the one relying on multi-
valued consensus for the result consensus phase performs
worse than its binary consensus counterpart. This illustrates
that the (IC,BC-RBB) approach, even though it has a more
costly first phase, outperforms (IC,MC-RBB) because of its
efficiency in the second phase. We repeat this experiment in the
WAN setting (Figure 4d) and find that the same trend applies.
We now examine the effect of faults on the performance of
each algorithm. We inject a single fault in the system, which
is enough to trigger timeouts and reveal the cost of timing
dependencies. In Figure 4b, we illustrate the performance
of each algorithm in a LAN setting, with a modest timeout
value of three seconds. Results illustrate the inefficiency of
employing multiple timeouts in such an environment. Our
adaptation of Pease’s algorithm, which is the best alternative
in the fault-free case, actually exhibits the worst performance
in the presence of a single fault. We repeat this experiment
in a WAN environment. Our results are depicted in Figure 4e
and illustrate that the same trend applies. However, we note
that we use the same timeout value in both LAN and WAN
settings, i.e., three seconds, to provide for an even comparison.
In a real deployment, one would employ a much larger timeout
value for the WAN case, resulting in a more significant impact
on the algorithms’ performance. In Figure 3 we plot the same
data as that shown in Figure 4e, but without Pease’s algorithm.
This allows us to see more clearly the differences between the
other two algorithms. We find that (IC,BC-RBB) consistently
provides latency improvements over (IC,MC-RBB), ranging
from 10% to 30%.
Lastly, we evaluate the throughput of the algorithms by
running 50 parallel instances of each algorithm, in the LAN
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Fig. 4. Performance of the algorithms under LAN (4a - 4c, 4f) and WAN (4d - 4e) settings. The first two columns depict the latency of each algorithm under
fault-free (4a, 4d) and faulty scenarios (4b, 4e). The third column depicts the throughput of each algorithm while executing 50 parallel instances with and without
Pease’s variant.
setting. We present our results in Figure 4c (all algorithms)
and 4f (without Pease’s variant). Since it is a fault-free case,
Pease’s variant exhibits the best performance. Between (IC,BC-
RBB) and (IC,MC-RBB), the former consistently provides
higher throughput ranging from 16% to 63% improvement.
(IC,BC-RBB)’s improved performance results from the reduced
complexity of the result consensus phase, which is achieved
by the use of consistent broadcast in the value dissemination
phase. We repeated the same experiments in the WAN setting
and observe similar trends, which we omit due to lack of space.
To summarize, our adaptation of Pease’s variant is fastest
in fault-free settings, due to its reduced message complexity
and its lack of signature operations. However, once faults
are introduced, (IC,BC-RBB) performs the best. Furthermore,
(IC,BC-RBB) is among the top-two for all evaluated scenarios
and requires only one synchronization point, in contrast with
Pease’s variant, which requires multiple. The reader will notice
that absolute performance numbers are low. However, we are
not proposing IC as a means to implement high-throughput
applications. Instead, we have found IC to be useful in appli-
cations, such as a distributed e-voting system we built. We use
it there, only once per election, to resolve diverged views of
multiple vote collectors, after the election has completed [9].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we tackle the problem of Interactive Con-
sistency (IC) in practical, real-world systems. This problem
has received little attention in this setting so far, and we
present a suite of algorithms and their implementations which
can be used to solve this problem. These range from porting
Pease’s synchronous algorithm and making multiple timing as-
sumptions, to composing more sophisticated algorithms based
on existing broadcast and consensus primitives with a single
timing assumption. We also define a more relaxed version of
the problem, which we call Eventual Interactive Consistency
(EIC), that is suitable for some applications, and we describe
possible approaches for solving the problem without any
timing assumptions.
Most of the algorithms in the protocol stack we built have
been proposed but never been implemented and evaluated
(to our knowledge) in a real system before. We have ex-
perimentally compared the performance of all algorithms and
highlighted trade-offs that arise in different system settings. We
find that one size does not fit all; for example, our adaptation of
Pease’s algorithm appears to be more appropriate for settings
where node failures are rare, but once faults do occur, its
performance degrades more than the remaining approaches.
With this work, we hope to provide a framework with which
system designers can reason about the appropriate IC approach
to use. A download link for our open-source software will be
included upon publication.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF CORRECTNESS - INTERACTIVE CONSISTENCY
A. The adversarial model
We assume a distributed system of n nodes that commu-
nicate with each other via authenticated message exchanges.
Each node ni has an arbitrary length private value vi ∈ U,
where U is the domain of values that can be proposed. We
assume that there exists a global clock variable Clock ∈ N
and that each node ni is equipped with a local clock variable
Clock[ni] ∈ N and an input message tape. When node ni
wishes to send a message m to node nj , it sends a tuple
(ni, nj ,m) to the adversary A.
To model synchronization loss among the clocks of honest
nodes caused by the adversary A, we define the following
events:
1) The event Inc(i) : i← i+1 that causes clock i to advance
by one time unit.
2) The event Init(ni) : Clock[ni] ← Clock that initializes
the local clock variable of a node ni by synchronizing it
with the global clock variable Clock.
The adversarial setting for A is as follows:
1) The adversary A can corrupt a fixed subset of nodes
M , where max{|M |} = t ≤ bn−13 c. If A adds a
node ni to M , then it has full control over it. If
ni /∈ M , then A runs once, and in order, the procedures
Init(ni) and Initialize() to successfully initialize ni.
Then, ni will spawn a task T1 which will execute the
V alue Dissemination() procedure.
2) Access to the local clock variable of ni is restricted to
A and ni. No honest node has access to the global clock
variable Clock.
3) A may arbitrarily invoke the events Inc(Clock[ni]) and
Inc(Clock).
4) There exists an upper bound ∆ on the drift of all honest
nodes’ local clocks compared to the global clock variable,
i.e., |Clock[ni] − Clock| ≤ ∆, where | · | denotes the
absolute value.
5) There exists a value End such that for each honest
node ni, if Clock[ni] ≥ End, then, ni assumes that the
value dissemination phase has ended and will immediately
move on to the result consensus phase, i.e., it will
spawn a task T2 that will immediately start executing the
Result Consensus() procedure. At this point, task T1
will immediately drop, and will not process, messages of
the value dissemination phase.
6) A can freely examine the contents of any message m of
any tuple (ni, nj ,m).
7) A can write on the input message tape of any node ni.
8) There exists an upper bound δ on the time that A can
delay the delivery of the messages between honest nodes.
More formally, when an honest node ni sends a tuple
(ni, nj ,m) to A, if the value of the global clock variable
is t, then A must write (ni,m) to the input tape of honest
node nj by global clock time: Clock = t+ δ.
For the first phase of our IC protocols, we will derive an
upper bound on the time required for honest nodes to receive
the private values of all other honest nodes. This bound will
be derived using the upper time bounds that correspond to
each step of the value dissemination phase. The upper time
bound of each step will be computed based on the appropriate
reference point. For instance, when we compute an upper time
bound of a node’s local computation, the reference point will
be a node’s local clock variable Clock[ni]. Similarly, when we
compute an upper time bound on the delivery of a message
between honest nodes, the reference point will be the global
clock variable Clock, according to assumption 8 above.
B. IC,MC-RBB - Proof of Correctness
In this section we prove the correctness of our (IC,MC-
RBB) algorithm. Figure 5 presents the algorithm of this proto-
col. Recall that in (IC,MC-RBB), nodes use a simple multicast
for the value dissemination phase and n parallel instances
of multi-valued consensus for the result consensus phase. A
multicast() instance receives two inputs. The first input is
the unique identifier of the node initiating the multicast().
The second input is the value that will be multicast. When
an instance of a multicast() primitive initiated by nj ter-
minates at some node ni, we state that an (nj , vj) tuple is
obtained by ni. The Result Consensus() procedure invokes
an MV Consensus() primitive. This is a multi-valued con-
sensus protocol and it receives two inputs. The first input is a
consensus instance identifier i, where i ∈ [1, n]. The second
input is the value that will be used as the private input for this
Common node inputs: n, t ≤ bn−1
3
c, End
Local inputs for node ni: ni, vi
Local output for node ni: V
procedure Initialize() :
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
V [i] =⊥;
end for
agreedV alues = 0;
Task T1:
procedure V alue Dissemination() :
multicast(ni, vi);
while 1 do
wait until (nj , vj) is obtained;
V [j] = vj ;
end while
Task T2:
procedure Result Consensus() :
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
MV Consensus(i, V [i])
end for
while agreedV alues 6= n do
wait until (ni, vi) is agreed;
V [i] = vi;
++ agreedV alues;
end while
Fig. 5. Protocol (IC,MC-RBB).
consensus instance by the node invoking MV Consensus().
When MV Consensus() instance i terminates at some node
nj , we say that an (ni, vi) tuple is agreed and we assume that
this tuple becomes available to nj .
Algorithmic Step Upper time bound of each clock
Clock Clock[ni]
Honest nodes are
initialized 0 ∆
Honest nodes multicast
their values tcomp + 2∆ tcomp + ∆
Honest nodes receive
the private values of
honest nodes
tcomp + 2∆ + δ tcomp + 3∆ + δ
Table I. Upper time bounds for Clock and Clock[ni] at each
algorithmic step. Grayed cells indicate the reference point (clock variable)
with respect to which upper time bounds are calculated.
Theorem 1: Let A be an adversary model as the one
described in Appendix A-A and that all honest nodes have been
successfully initialized at global clock time: Clock = 0. Let
tcomp be the maximum preparation time required to multicast
a message. Every honest node ni will have obtained all of the
private values of all honest nodes when its local clock reading
is: Clock[ni] ≤ tcomp + 3∆ + δ.
Proof: We will compute an upper bound on the time required
for honest nodes to receive the private values of all other honest
nodes. Table I illustrates the upper time bounds of all clock
variables, at each algorithmic step, to ease the understanding
of the computation described below.
The initialization of every honest node ni will have been
completed at local clock time: Clock[ni] ≤ ∆. Then, each
honest node ni performs at most tcomp steps before it multi-
casts its value to the rest of the nodes. When each honest node
ni multicasts its value to the rest of the nodes, the value of the
global clock is: Clock ≤ tcomp + 2∆. All honest nodes will
receive the private values of all other honest nodes at global
clock time: Clock ≤ tcomp + 2∆ + δ, which implies that the
time of their internal clocks is at most tcomp + 3∆ + δ.
Corollary 1.1: By setting End ≥ tcomp + 3∆ + δ, if ni
is non-faulty, then all non-faulty nodes will have obtained
its private value vi, by the beginning of the result consensus
phase.
We will use Corollary 1.1 to prove two Lemmas that will
be used, subsequently, to prove that (IC,MC-RBB) satisfies all
of the IC properties.
Lemma 1: If at the beginning of the result consensus phase
of (IC,MC-RBB) all non-faulty nodes know the same value vi
for node ni, then vi will appear in the ith slot of the result
vector V of all non-faulty nodes.
Proof: From the MVC1 Validity property of multi-valued
consensus, we have that every correct process that decides,
will decide vi. Due to the MVC5 Termination property of
multi-valued consensus, all non-faulty nodes eventually decide.
Thus, all correct processes will eventually decide vi and will
set V [i] = vi.
Lemma 2: If at the beginning of the result consensus phase
of (IC,MC-RBB) all non-faulty nodes have conflicting opinions
about the value of (faulty) node ni, then some value vi will
appear in the ith slot of the result vector V of all non-faulty
nodes.
Proof: Due to the MVC5 Termination property of multi-
valued consensus, all non-faulty nodes will eventually decide
on a value. From the MVC4 Agreement property of multi-
valued consensus, we have that correct processes never decide
differently. Thus, all correct processes will decide on some vi
and will set V [i] = vi.
Theorem 2: The IC,MC-RBB protocol satisfies the proper-
ties of IC.
Proof: Agreement: Lemmas 1 and 2 guarantee that all non-
faulty nodes will always agree on the same value vi for the
ith slot of the result vector, ∀i ∈ [1, n]. Thus, since every slot
of the result vector will have the same value across all non-
faulty nodes, it follows that all non-faulty nodes agree on the
same vector of values V .
Validity: This follows directly from Lemma 1.
Termination: From Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that all non-
faulty nodes are guaranteed to agree on a value for each slot of
the result vector V . Thus, all non-faulty nodes will eventually
decide on a vector V .
C. Consistent broadcast
In Figure 6, we present a simplified adaption of Consistent
Broadcast from [45]. In this protocol, each source node ni
sends its value v to all other nodes and waits for n − t
signed endorsement responses. Each recipient node endorses
only the first value received for every broadcast. Once the
corresponding responses are accumulated, the sender encloses
all received endorsements in a uniqueness certificate and sends
the certificate, along with the value, to all nodes of the system.
Initialization:
v˜ ← ⊥; ν˜ ← ⊥
v′ ← ⊥
W ← ∅; r ← 0
Upon c-broadcast(Ni, v):
v′ ← v
send message (c-send, Ni, v) to all
Upon receiving message (c-send, Nb, v) from Ns:
if s = b and v˜ = ⊥ then
v˜ ← v
compute signature σ on (c-ready, Nb, v)
send message (c-ready, Nb, v, σ) to Ns
Upon receiving message (c-ready, Nb, v, σ) from Ns for the first time:
if b = i and v = v′ and σ is a valid signature then
W ←W ∪ {σ}
r ← r + 1
if r = n− t then
send message (c-final, Ni, v, W ) to all
Upon receiving message (c-final, Nb, v, W ) from Ns:
if ν˜ = ⊥ and W contains n− t valid signatures for v then
ν˜ ← v
c-deliver(v)
Fig. 6. Consistent Broadcast using digital signatures for node Ni.
Consistent Broadcast delivers a value v, iff the associated
certificate contains at least n− t valid signatures.
D. IC,BC-RBB - Proof of Correctness
In this section we prove the correctness of our (IC,BC-RBB)
algorithm. Figure 7 presents the algorithm of this protocol.
Recall that in (IC,BC-RBB), nodes use consistent broadcast
for the value dissemination phase and n parallel instances of
binary consensus for the result consensus phase. In contrast to
the original implementation of CB that accounts for member-
ship changes across different system views, our IC protocols
assume static membership, i.e., there is only one view. Thus,
we can safely strip the view number from the messages of
CB. We denote a message m signed by node ni as 〈m〉σi .
A Consistent Broadcast() instance receives as inputs two
values. The first input is the unique identifier of the node
initiating the Consistent Broadcast() instance. The second
input is the value that will be broadcast. When an instance of
Consistent Broadcast() initiated by nj terminates to some
node ni, it delivers an (nj , vj , cj) tuple, which we say is
obtained by ni. The third value, cj , of an obtained tuple
(nj , vj , cj) is a set of 〈nj , vj〉σk tuples with valid signatures,
from (n − t) distinct nodes that support the claim that vi is
the private value of ni. The Result Consensus() procedure
invokes a B Consensus() primitive. This is a binary consen-
sus protocol and it receives two inputs. The first input is a
consensus instance identifier i, where i ∈ [1, n]. The second
input is a binary value that will be used as the private input for
this consensus instance by the node invoking B Consensus().
When B Consensus() instance i terminates at some node nj ,
we say that an (ni, bi) tuple is agreed and we assume that this
tuple becomes available to nj . We say that the outcome of a
binary consensus instance i is the value bi of an agreed tuple
(ni, bi).
Theorem 3: Let A be an adversary model as the one
described in Appendix A-A and that all honest nodes have
been successfully initialized at global clock time: Clock = 0.
Let tcomp be the worst-case running time, across all nodes, of
any local computation required at any step of CB, including
the maximum time required to prepare to multicast and/or send
a message. Every honest node ni will have obtained all of the
private values of all honest nodes when its local clock reading
is: Clock[ni] ≤ (n+ 2)tcomp + 7∆ + 3δ.
Proof: We will compute an upper bound on the time required
for honest nodes to receive the private values of all other honest
nodes. Table II illustrates the upper time bounds of all clock
variables, at each algorithmic step, to ease the understanding
of the computation described below.
The initialization of every honest node ni will have
been completed at local clock time: Clock[ni] ≤ ∆. Then,
each honest node ni performs at most tcomp steps before
it multicasts an c-send message to the rest of the nodes.
When each honest node ni multicasts an c-send message
to the rest of the nodes, the value of the global clock is:
Clock ≤ tcomp + 2∆. All honest nodes will receive the c-
send messages of all other honest nodes at global clock time:
Clock ≤ tcomp + 2∆ + δ, which implies that their local clock
variable is at most: Clock[ni] ≤ tcomp + 3∆ + δ. Apparently,
each honest node will receive, at most, n c-send messages.
Therefore, each honest node ni will perform at most n×tcomp
steps before it responds with an c-ready message for each c-
send message it received. Each honest node will receive the
c-ready messages for its own private value at global clock
time: Clock ≤ (n+ 1)tcomp + 4∆ + 2δ. Then, correct nodes
will prepare to multicast a c-final message for their private
value, which will require, at most, tcomp steps. This will
take place when their local clock reading is: Clock[ni] ≤
(n + 2)tcomp + 5∆ + 2δ. All honest nodes will receive the
c-final messages for the private values of every other honest
node at global clock time: Clock ≤ (n+ 2)tcomp + 6∆ + 3δ,
which implies that their local clock reading is: Clock[ni] ≤
(n+ 2)tcomp + 7∆ + 3δ. Thus, every honest node will obtain
the private value of every other honest node by local clock
time: Clock[ni] ≤ (n+ 2)tcomp + 7∆ + 3δ.
Corollary 3.1: By setting End ≥ (n+2)tcomp+7∆+3δ,
if ni is non-faulty, then all non-faulty nodes will have obtained
its private value vi, by the beginning of the result consensus
phase.
In the result consensus phase of (IC,BC-RBB), an honest
node ni will vote 1 for binary consensus instance j iff it
obtained the private value of nj by the end of the value
dissemination phase. Otherwise, an honest node will always
vote 0. We assume that all non-faulty nodes store the outcome
of every binary consensus instance i in the ith slot of a vector
B, where B[i] ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ [1, n]. Vector B should not be
confused with vector V , which is the result vector.
Lemma 3: All non-faulty nodes will eventually agree on
the same vector B.
Proof: This follows trivially from the properties of binary con-
sensus which guarantee that all honest nodes will eventually
decide the same value. Since all honest nodes eventually decide
Common node inputs: n, t ≤ bn−1
3
c, End
Local inputs for node ni: ni, vi
Local output for node ni: V
procedure Initialize() :
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
V [i] =⊥;
C[i] =⊥;
end for
agreedV alues = 0;
Task T1:
procedure V alue Dissemination() :
Consistent Broadcast(ni, vi);
while 1 do
wait until (nj , vj , cj) is obtained;
V [j] = vj ;
C[j] = cj ;
end while
Task T2:
procedure Result Consensus() :
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
if V [i] =⊥ then
B Consensus(i, 0);
else
B Consensus(i, 1);
end if
end for
while agreedV alues 6= n do
wait until (ni, bi) is agreed;
B[i] = bi;
++ agreedV alues;
end while
Finalize V ();
Fig. 7. Protocol (IC,BC-RBB).
the same value bi ∈ {0, 1} for binary consensus instance i,
then, all honest nodes will eventually set B[i] = bi, ∀i ∈ [1, n].
Thus, all honest nodes eventually agree on the same vector B.
Algorithmic Step Upper time bound of each clock
Clock Clock[ni]
Honest nodes are
initialized 0 ∆
Honest nodes multicast
c-send messages tcomp + 2∆ tcomp + ∆
Honest nodes receive
c-send messages of
honest nodes
tcomp + 2∆ + δ tcomp + 3∆ + δ
Honest nodes unicast
c-ready messages (n+1)tcomp+4∆+δ (n+1)tcomp+3∆+δ
Honest nodes receive
c-ready messages of
honest nodes
(n+ 1)tcomp +
4∆ + 2δ
(n+ 1)tcomp +
5∆ + 2δ
Honest nodes multicast
c-final messages
(n+ 2)tcomp +
6∆ + 2δ
(n+ 2)tcomp +
5∆ + 2δ
Honest nodes receive
c-final messages of
honest nodes
(n+ 2)tcomp +
6∆ + 3δ
(n+ 2)tcomp +
7∆ + 3δ
Table II. Upper time bounds for Clock and Clock[ni] at each
algorithmic step. Grayed cells indicate the reference point (clock variable)
with respect to which upper time bounds are calculated.
When all n parallel instances of binary consensus have
completed, honest nodes will begin finalizing each slot of the
result vector according to the algorithm presented in Figure 8.
Recall, there is a special case where the outcome of a binary
consensus instance i is bi = 1, but the private value of (faulty)
node ni was not obtained by an honest node nk, by the end
of the value dissemination phase. In this case, nk will invoke
the Retrieve V alue() procedure, presented in Figure 9, to
retrieve the private value of ni. This will cause nk to multicast
a (retrieve, ni) message. Upon the receipt of a (retrieve, ni)
message, an honest node nj executes the algorithm presented
in Figure 10. Provided that the value vi of node ni was
obtained by nj by the end of the value dissemination phase,
nj will reply to nk with a valid (retrieved value, ni, vi, ci)
message. We say that a (retrieved value, ni, vi, ci) message is
valid iff ci is a set of 〈nj , vj〉σk tuples with valid signatures,
from (n − t) distinct nodes that support the claim that vi is
the private value of ni. When an honest node executing the
Retrieve V alue() procedure receives such a valid message,
we say that it retrieves the value vi of node ni.
procedure Finalize V () :
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
if B[i] = 0 then
V [i] =⊥;
C[i] =⊥;
else
if V [i] =⊥ then
Retrieve V alue(ni);
end if
end if
end for
Fig. 8. Procedure Finalize V () is invoked by honest nodes when all n
instances of binary consensus have completed to finalize the result vector V .
procedure Retrieve V alue(ni) :
send message (retrieve, ni) to all nodes;
wait until the receipt of a valid (retrieved value, ni, vi, ci) message;
V [i] = vi;
C[i] = ci;
Fig. 9. Protocol Retrieve V alue() for retrieving obtained values.
Upon the receipt of a (retrieve, ni) from nk do
if V [i] 6=⊥ then
send a (retrieved value, ni, V [i], C[i]) message to nk;
end if
Fig. 10. Honest node behavior on the receipt of a (retrieve, ni) message.
Lemma 4: Assume that the outcome of binary consensus
instance i is bi = 1. An honest node nj executing the
Retrieve V alue() procedure for input node ni will, eventu-
ally, complete the protocol. Additionally, the retrieved value
v is the one broadcasted (using CB) by node ni.
Proof: Since the outcome of binary consensus instance i is
bi = 1, there is at least one non-faulty node that voted
1 for this binary consensus instance, and hence possesses
the value broadcasted (using CB) by ni. This honest node
will always respond with a valid retrieved value message,
as honest nodes comply with protocol rules. A malicious
node, due to the Integrity property of CB, cannot construct
a valid retrieved value message for a value v′ which was
not broadcasted by ni. Thus, the behavior of malicous nodes
is restricted to either replying with a valid retrieved value
message, or not replying at all, since messages that are not
valid are rejected by honest nodes. Furthermore, if ni is faulty,
the Integrity property also guarantees that all honest nodes
will obtain at most one value, which, from the Agreement
property of CB, will be the same across all non-faulty nodes
that actually obtained it. Thus, an honest node executing
the Retrieve V alue() procedure is guaranteed to eventually
receive a valid retrieved value message and, thus, retrieve
the value v broadcasted (using CB) by ni.
Theorem 4: The (IC,BC-RBB) protocol satisfies the prop-
erties of IC.
Proof: Agreement: Lemma 3 guarantees that all non-faulty
nodes will eventually agree on the same vector of binary values
B. If B[i] = 0 for some i ∈ [1, n], then all non-faulty nodes
will deterministically set V [i] =⊥. IfB[i] = 1 we discriminate
between two cases. First, if an honest node obtained a value
vi of node ni by the end of the value dissemination phase,
it takes no action since it has already set V [i] = vi. Also,
due to the Agreement property of CB, all non-faulty nodes
that obtain a value for node ni, obtain the same value vi.
Second, if an honest node did not obtain a value for node ni
by the end of the value dissemination phase, it will, eventually,
execute the Recover V alue() procedure. From Lemma 4, it
follows that it will retrieve the value vi that was broadcasted
(using CB) by ni during the value dissemination phase and
will, eventually, set V [i] = vi. Thus, since every slot of the
result vector V will have the same value across all non-faulty
nodes, it follows that all non-faulty nodes agree on the same
vector of values V .
Validity: From Corollary 3.1, it follows that the private
value vi of an honest node ni has been obtained by all non-
faulty nodes by the end of the value dissemination phase. This
will result in all non-faulty nodes to vote bi = 1 for binary
consensus instance i, which will, eventually, lead all non-faulty
nodes to setB[i] = 1 due to the properties of binary consensus.
Thus, all non-faulty nodes will, eventually, output V [i] = vi.
Termination: From Lemma 3, it follows that all non-faulty
nodes will, eventually, execute procedure Finalize V (). We
only deal with the Retrieve V alue() invocation, since all
other steps require only local deterministic computation.
From Lemma 4, an honest node will always complete the
Retrieve V alue() protocol. Thus, we have that all honest
nodes will eventually complete the Finalize V () procedure.
APPENDIX B
MESSAGE COMPLEXITIES AND SIGNATURE OPERATIONS
In this section, we present the message complexity and
signature operations for each algorithm presented in this paper.
The term ”signature operations” includes signature generations
and verifications. We also assume graceful executions of con-
sensus, meaning that, when invoked, all consensus instances
terminate without progressing to a second phase.
A. Multicast (MU)
A multicast primitive is comprised of a single step, during
which, a node sends its value to all other nodes, without any
guarantee that every node will eventually deliver that value.
The message complexity for invoking one instance of this
multicast primitive equals to n messages, without requiring
any signature operations.
Message Complexity: n
Signature Operations: −
B. Bracha’s reliable broadcast (RBB)
Bracha’s reliable broadcast ([14]) is comprised of three
individual steps. During the first step, the source node sends
an initial message to all other nodes (n messages). During
the second step, each node that receives an initial message,
sends an echo message to the rest nodes (n2 messages). Finally,
during the third step, each node that receives an echo message,
sends a ready message to all other nodes (n2 messages).
The message complexity for invoking one instance of
Bracha’s reliable broadcast equals to 2n2+n messages, without
requiring any signature operations.
Message Complexity: 2n2 + n
Signature Operations: −
C. Consistent Broadcast (CB)
As presented in Figure 6, Consistent Broadcast ([45]) is
comprised of three steps, each one with linear complexity.
During the first step, the source node sends a c-send message
to all other nodes (n messages). During the second step, each
node that receives a c-send message, sends back to the sender
a signed c-ready message (n messages). Finally, during the
third step, the sender sends a c-final message to the rest nodes
of the system (n messages).
In addition, during the second step, each node generates
one signature, before echoing the value back to the sender (n
signature generations). Furthermore, during the third step, the
sender verifies the signature of every received c-final message
(n signature verifications). Finally, each node that receives a
c-final message, must verify its set of signatures (n2 signature
verifications).
The message complexity for invoking one instance of
Consistent Broadcast is 3n with n2 + 2n signature operations.
Message Complexity: 3n
Signature Operations: n2 + 2n
D. Bracha’s Binary Consensus (BC)
The invocation of one instance of Bracha’s binary consen-
sus will trigger three instances of Bracha’s reliable broadcast,
without requiring any additional signature operations. The
message complexity can be calculated by multiplying the
complexity of reliable broadcast by a factor of three. This
message complexity corresponds to the messages provoked by
one node that participates in the consensus. To derive the entire
message complexity of the algorithm we must also multiply
the previous result with a factor of n.
The message complexity for invoking one instance of
Binary consensus (BC-RBB) equals to n ∗ 3 ∗ RBB =
n∗3∗(2n2+n) = 6n3+3n2, since all nodes will broadcast their
value. For this algorithm, no signature operations are required.
Message Complexity: 6n3 + 3n2
Signature Operations: −
E. Multi-valued Consensus (MC)
To implement multi-valued consensus ([8]), we use
Bracha’s reliable broadcast and Bracha’s consensus algorithm
([14]). An instance of the multi-valued consensus protocol
utilizes two instances of reliable broadcast and one instance
of binary consensus.
The message complexity for invoking one instance of
multi-valued consensus (MC-RBB) equals to n ∗ 2 ∗RBB +
(BC-RBB) = n ∗ 2 ∗ (2n2 + n) + 6n3 + 3n2 = 10n3 + 5n2,
without requiring any signature operations.
Message Complexity: 10n3 + 5n2
Signature Operations: −
F. Interactive Consistency BC-RBB
The BC-RBB configuration is comprised of Consistent
Broadcast and Bracha’s binary consensus. The message com-
plexity for invoking one instance of BC-RBB equals to n ∗
(CB+(BC-RBB)) = n∗(3n+(6n3+3n2)) = 6n4+3n3+3n2,
along with n∗(CB+(BC-RBB)) = n∗(n2 +2n) = n3 +2n2
signature operations.
Message Complexity: 6n4 + 3n3 + 3n2
Signature Operations: n3 + 2n2
G. Interactive Consistency MC-RBB
The MC-RBB configuration is comprised of a simple
multicast primitive and multi-valued consensus. Each multicast
primitive and multi-valued consensus will be invoked n times,
equal to the number of nodes in the system.
The message complexity for invoking one instance of MC-
RBB equals to n ∗ (MU + (MC-RBB)) = n ∗ (n+ (10n3 +
5n2)) = 10n4 + 5n3 + n2 without any signature operations.
Message Complexity: 10n4 + 5n3 + n2
Signature Operations: −
